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LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS, JUDICIAL AMENDMENT OF STATUTES, AND
THEORY-OF-THE-CASE PLEADING: Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.

Two men approached the seventeen-year-old desk clerk at che La
Quinta Motor Inn at 4 a.m. One of them, identifying himself as Benson in room 233, claimed that he had lost his key. The desk clerk
handed the man a hotel passkey without making any attempt to verify
his identity. With the aid of the passkey, the men entered the room
in which Mr. and Mrs. Kraaz were staying and robbed them of $23,000.
An elderly security guard slept through the entire event. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in allowing the Kraazes full recovery of the
stolen amount, held that Louisiana Civil Code article 2971,1 which limits
the liability of innkeepers to $100 for property lost by their guests,
did not apply to an innkeeper's delictual liability. Kraaz v. La Quinta
Motor Inns, Inc., 410 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1982).
At first glance, Kraaz appears to be a relatively simple case involving the proper interpretation of article 2971. A recent legislative
act, however, has made the Kraaz case part of an interesting pattern
of judicial and legislative action and reaction. Additionally, the case
forms a part of another more important and disturbing pattern: a
retreat in the recent jurisprudence to the use of "theory-of-the-case"
pleading.
At common law, innkeepers were considered insurers of the property of their guests.! Several articles of the Louisiana Digest of 1808
treated innkeepers similarly. The statutes designated innkeepers as
necessary depositaries3 and held them strictly liable for the loss of
their guests' property, regardless of whether such property was
actually delivered into their hands.4 Losses due to "extraordinary
violence" were the lone exception to this imposition of strict liability.5
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1. LA. CIV. CODE S art. 2971 (as it appeared prior to 1982 La. Acts, No. 382,
S 1) read as follows:
No landlord or innkeeper shall be liable under the provisions of the foregoing
six articles to any guests or party of guests occupying the same apartments for
any loss sustained by such guests or party of guests by theft or otherwise, in
any sum exceeding one hundred dollars, unless by special agreement in writing
with the proprietor, manager or lessee of the hotel or inn a greater liability has
been contracted for.
Provided that no guest shall be held bound by the limitation of value established in this Article unless this Article is conspicuously posted in the guest room.
2. Note, Innkeepers-Limitationof Liabilityfor Loss of Guests' Property-Article
2971, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, 22 TUL. L. REV. 333 (1947).
3. LA. DIGEST OF 1808, bk. III, tit. XI, art. 30.
4. LA. DIGEST OF 1808, bk. III, tit. XI, art. 31.
5. LA. DIGEST OF 1808, bk. III, tit. XI, art 33.
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The statutory scheme subsequently was amended to limit the innkeeper's exposure to liability! One article of the Louisiana Digest of
1808 was reenacted and amended to provide that innkeepers were
responsible for the property of their guests which was not delivered
into their hands only if the property was delivered into the care of
one of their servants.' Two articles, which first appeared in the
Revised Civil Code of 1870, grant further relief to innkeepers. Louisiana Civil Code article 2968 requires the innkeeper to provide a safe
for valuables and to post notices of its availability. Article 2969 provides that innkeepers who comply with article 2968 will not be liable
for the loss of valuables not deposited in the safe unless the loss occurs
through their fraud or negligence. In 1912, article 2971 was amended
and reenacted to limit the liability of innkeepers for losses sustained
by their guests "by theft or otherwise" to $100.
This 1912 amendment to article 2971 was first interpreted in
Pfennig v. Roosevelt Hotel,' in which the plaintiff's $750 fur coat was
delivered to a bell boy for shipping and the coat subsequently disappeared. The hotel hdd provided a safe and had posted the statutorilyrequired notices. The issue presented was whether the innkeeper was
required to prove a lack of negligence on its part in order to obtain
the benefits of the statutory limitation. The court, holding that such
proof was unnecessary, stated that the provisions of article 2971 "indicated a plain intention that no matter how the loss is occasioned,
the limitation is available to the innkeeper."'
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal considered the scope of the
article 2971 limitation in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Fairmont Roosevelt
Hotel.1" The plaintiff, a fur salesman, brought an action against the
hotel to recover the value of fifty-one pieces of fine fur which allegedly
were stolen from his hotel room. The salesman contended that the
6. Historically, innkeepers were made insurers of their guests' property because
travelers were "obliged to rely almost implicitly on the good faith of inn-holders, who
might have frequent opportunities of associating with ruffians or pilferers." Profilet
v. Hall & Hildreth, 14 La. Ann. 524, 525 (1859). As travel became more common and
the value of objects which travelers took with them increased, "the least negligence
on [the innkeeper's] part [could] permit the commission of thefts of considerable amount,
capable of ruining with a single blow an unfortunate hotel keeper." 2 M. PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 2222 at 280 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959). The
statutes regulating the liability of innkeepers were amended to protect innkeepers
from exposure to such "excessive risks." Id. See also Laubie v. Sonesta Int'l Hotel
Corp., 398 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1981).
7. LA. DIGEST OF 1808, bk. III, tit. XI, art. 31 was amended and reenacted in 1825
as LA. CIv. CODE art. 2937. This article subsequently was reenacted in 1870 as La.
Civ. Code art. 2966.
8. 31 So. 2d 31 (La. App. Orl. 1947).
9. Id. at 34.
10. 250 So. 2d 94 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 259 La. 875, 253 So. 2d 213 (1971).
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innkeeper was grossly negligent in not providing adequate security
and that the innkeeper should not be allowed to invoke the limitation
of liability provided by article 2971. The innkeeper maintained a vault
sufficiently large to accommodate the furs and had complied with the
notice requirements. The court reasoned that the hotel's strict liability
had been modified by its compliance with the codal requirements and
held that regardless of whether the hotel was negligent, its liability
was limited to $100.
In Laubie v. Sonesta International Hotel Corp.," the Louisiana
Supreme Court, considering for the first time whether the legislative
intent behind the amendment was to limit the innkeeper's liability
for property which was not deposited in the hotel safe and which was
lost through the innkeeper's negligence, overruled both the Pfennig
and Zurich interpretations of article 2971. While the Laubies were
guests at the Royal Sonesta, valuable jewelry was stolen from their
room. The court held that "the legislative aim of Article 2971, as
amended by Act 231 of 1912, was only to limit the contractual liability
of an innkeeper as depositary" and that "Article 2971 [had] no application to the question of an innkeeper's delictual responsibility."'"
Relying heavily on the historical development of the innkeeper's liability as a depositary in the codal scheme and the placement of article
2971 in the Code under the chapter "Of Necessary Deposit," the court
stated that it found no indication of a legislative intent "to place
innkeepers .. .in a more favored position than ordinary members
of the public who must respond fully for breach of a delictual duty
imposed by general law."'3 The court concluded that article 2971 was
"merely another step to reduce [the innkeeper's] onerous contractual
burden as a depositary."' 4 The opinion in Kraaz, then, was little more
than an affirmation of the earlier Laubie holding as to the duty of
an innkeeper to respond for a violation of a "delictual duty."
In a recent session, the legislature amended article 2971 to provide that "no ... innkeeper .. .shall be liable contractually or delictually . . .to any guests . . .for any loss . . .in any sum exceeding
five hundred dollars."" This amendment overruled both Kraaz and
Laubie and reinstated the interpretation given the article by the courts
of appeal in Pfennig and Zurich.
Such tension between the judicial and legislative branches has

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
added).

398 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1981).
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1378.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2971, as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 382, S 1 (emphasis
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become increasingly common. The legislature recently has reinstated
interpretations of a Civil Code article made by courts of appeal, but
overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court, in cases involving the
liability of blood banks under article 1764 for supplying defective
blood.'" The courts of appeal, on four occasions, had considered the
effect of this article on the strict liability of distributors of blood. 7
In each case, the court of appeal rejected the plaintiff's strict liability
claim, reasoning that the legislative intent behind article 1764, which
removes the implied warranty of fitness from the sale of blood and
classifies blood as a service rather than a product, was to deny
recovery to the plaintiff under any legal theory other than negligence.
Writs were applied for and denied in three of these cases.
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the issue for the first
time in DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co." The plaintiff
there contracted serum hepatitis following a blood transfusion and
brought suit against the blood bank. The court found that the blood
which the plaintiff received was defective and had caused the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant blood bank contended that it could not
be held liable absent proof that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from
negligence on its part. The blood bank's argument against strict
liability was based on the interpretation given to article 1764 by the
courts of appeal. The court, although acknowledging that strict liability
could be based on a theory of implied warranty, held that a distributor
of defective blood was strictly liable in tort.
The DeBattistacourt reasoned that article 1764 was a rule of contractual warranty, "developed to meet the needs of commercial
transactions,"' 9 which did not govern tort liability and stated that the
court of appeal decisions did not "represent correct interpretations
16. For a variation of this pattern, see Gulf Ref. Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171
So. 846 (1936), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished several of its own
decisions and held that "a lessee of [a] . . . mineral . . . lease has no real right in
• . . the leased land." 186 La. at 214, 171 So. at 854. The legislature's reaction was
unfavorable: "Oil, gas, and other mineral leases . . . are classified as real rights.
LA. R.S.
... 9:1105 (1950) (repealed 1974; reenacted in substance as LA. MIN. CODE:
La. R.S. 31:16 (1974)).
For a case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly enforced a statutory
limitation which the court of appeal had misconstrued, see Bazley v. Tortorich, 397
So. 2d 475 (La. 1981), and text at notes 62-63 infra.
17. Martin v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 352 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977),
writ denied, 354 So. 2d 210 (La. 1978); Adams v. New Orleans Blood-Bank, Inc., 343
So. 2d 363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Koppenol v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., 341 So.
2d 1242 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ denied, 343 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1977); Juneau v.
Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 333 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 337 So.
2d 220 (La. 1976).
18. 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981).
19. Id. at 32.
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of our law." 20 The legislature disagreed and enacted Louisiana Civil
Code article 2322.1 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2797, which
exempt blood distributors from "strict liability or liability of any kind
without negligence."'"
In addition to its role in the struggle between the judiciary and
the legislature, the Kraaz opinion is part of a recent judicial trend
in Louisiana toward the use of theory-of-the-case pleading. Louisiana
employs fact pleading as opposed to theory-of-the-case pleading.22
Under a fact pleading system, the plaintiff should not be required
to characterize his cause of action as he is entitled to relief under
any legal theory which may be justified by the proven facts.23
Theory-of-the-case pleading, on the other hand, requires the plaintiff to characterize his cause of action. The doctrine of theory-of-thecase pleading was derived from the common law writ system, which
required the plaintiff to bring his action under a specific writ or form
of action. The courts denied relief if the plaintiff chose the wrong
writ, regardless of the validity of his substantive claim.24 The injustice
of the writ system led to the adoption of procedural codes which
substituted fact pleading systems for the complex and highly technical
forms of action." The new fact pleading systems, however, were not
20. Id. at 33.
21. The constitutional validity of article 2322.1 and LA. R.S. 9:2797 (Supp. 1981)
is doubtful because of procedural errors in their enactment. See Johnson, 1981 Legislative

Developments Affecting Torts and Workers' Compensation, 29 LA. B.J. 105, 105-07 (1981).
22. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 891 provides that the petition "shall contain a short,
clear, and concise statement of the object of the demand and of the material facts
upon which the cause of action is based."
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 862 provides that "final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general
and equitable relief."
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2164 provides: "The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal."
23. See Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980); Cox v. W.M.
Heroman & Co., 298 So. 2d 848 (La. 1974).

24. See Tucker, Proposalfor Retention of the Louisiana System of Fact Pleading;
Expose des Motifs, 13 LA. L. REV. 395, 398 (1953); Note, Fact Pleading vs. Notice
Pleading: The Eternal Debate, 22 Loy. L. REV. 47, 48-49 (1976).
25. In 1848, New York, under the leadership of David Dudley Field, adopted the
New York Code of Procedure which introduced the system of fact pleading, N.Y. CODE
OF PROC. OF 1848 S 142, as amended by 1851 N.Y. LAWS ch. 479 ("The complaint shall
contain .. .[a]plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action
without unnecessary repetition .. ") and abolished the writ system, N.Y. CODE OF
PROC. OF 1848 S 69, as enacted by 1848 N.Y. LAWS ch. 379 ("The distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, heretofore
existing, are abolished .... " (emphasis added).
[In a grand procession various states have followed the lead of New York, until
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accepted by the courts. Prompted by their desire to cling to the
abolished writ system, the courts developed the theory-of-the-case doctrine. Under this doctrine, the plaintiff, although he need not proceed
under any of the old writs, is required to characterize his case under
a specific legal theory, with recovery contingent upon that
characterization.' Thus, the theory-of-the-case doctrine "is nothing but
the writ system without labels."2
Louisiana has never operated under the writ system, because its
procedural system is not based upon the common law.28 The theoryof-the-case doctrine, however, was applied in several cases prior to
1960.29 In 1960, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 862 and
2164 were enacted with the express purpose of abolishing the theoryof-the-case doctrine in Louisiana.30
Several recent decisions indicate that this legislative intent has
not been fully realized. In Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc.,"' the
plaintiff sought recovery of nonpecuniary damages caused by undue
delay in the repair of her car. The court held that nonpecuniary
damages were not recoverable in an action for breach of contract,
the object of which was physical gratification. The court completely
ignored the possibility that the plaintiffs factual allegations might have
authorized recovery in tort for which, as acknowledged by the court,
nonpecuniary damages are available. 2
In Philippe v. Browning Arms Co.,33 the plaintiff, who had been

today all of the states have departed from the common law writ system in varying degrees, and, of course, the vast federal system joined this majority by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.

Hubert, A Louisiana Anomaly-The "Writ" System in Real Actions, 22 TUL. L.

REV.

459, 461 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
26. See Hubert, The Theory of a Case in Louisiana, 24 TUL. L. REV. 66, 67 (1949).
27. Id. at 67.
28. For an exhaustive treatment of the history and development of Louisiana's
procedural system, see Note, supra note 24, at 52-58.
29. See Hubert, supra note 26, at 69-73, and cases cited therein.
30. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 862, comment (b) & 2164, comment (a). The Code
of Civil Procedure articles are quoted in note 22, supra. Professor Hubert was one
of the reporters for the Institute on the Revision of the Code of Practice.
31. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
32. Much authority exists for the proposition that a breach of contract involving
property also will give rise -to a tort. See Philippe v. Browning Arms. Co., 395 So.
2d 310 (La. 1980); Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 439 (La. 1976)
(Dixon, J., dissenting); Veazey v. W.T. Burton Indus., Inc., 407 So. 2d 59 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1981); Reeves v. Dixie Brick, Inc., 403 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Gray
& Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); see also Comment,

Damages Ex Contractu: Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damagesfor Breach of Contract Under
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1160, 1170-73 (1974).
33. 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
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injured when a shotgun accidentally discharged, sued the manufacturer of the shotgun demanding damages for personal injury and
attorney's fees under Louisiana Civil Code article 2545."4 On original
hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that when the
purchaser of a defective product is injured, "there arises a redhibitory
action, for the rescission of the sale, and a tort action for the personal injuries suffered."3'5 The court held, however, that attorney's fees
under article 2545 were not recoverable becabse "rescission of the
sale was not sought by plaintiff, but only damages arising from his
personal injuries. '3 8 On rehearing, the court reversed itself, reasoning that their previous analysis represented "a return to the requirement of pleading the theory of the case."37
In DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co.,8 the plaintiffs
petition included allegations of both breach of implied warranty and
strict liability in tort. 9 Louisiana Civil Code article 1764, which provides that the implied warranty of fitness does not apply to the sale
of blood, prevented the court from allowing recovery under the theory
of implied warranty. However, since the plaintiff also had "alleged a
cause of action based on strict liability in tort, the court was allowed,
unhindered by article 1764, to grant her the relief she requested. Conceivably, if the plaintiff had alleged only breach of the implied warranty of fitness, the court would have denied recovery by applying
article 1764. In so doing, the court would have been applying the doctrine of theory of the case because the plaintiffs right to recover would
have depended upon the plaintiffs characterization of the case in his
pleadings.
The doctrine of theory of the case should be distinguished from
the classification of the cause of action by the court in order to determine "some subsidiary issue, such as applicable prescriptive periods,
or the effect of restrictive non-codal provisions.""0 Ultimately, every
case is decided upon some legal theory, and "the nature of the theory
which prevails has important consequences."41 Two court of appeal

34. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2545 provides: "The seller, who knows the vice of the thing
he sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of price and repayment of
the expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, is answerable to the buyer in
damages."
35. 395 So. 2d at 313.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 318.
38. 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981).
39. Plaintiff's Petition for Damages at nos. 16 & 20, DeBattista v. ArgonautSouthwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981).
40. Gray & Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 829, 830 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
41. Hubert, supra note 26, at 68.
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decisions" involving Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:655, 4" which allows
a direct action against insurers in tort actions only, are illustrative
examples. In both cases, the defendant insurer filed a peremptory
exception of no cause of action on the ground that the plaintiffs cause
of action was in contract, not tort, and thus the plaintiff had no direct
action. In overruling the exceptions, both courts found that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action in tort as well as in contract.
In the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Kraaz; residents of Chicago, were
staying at the La Quinta Motor Inn while attending the horse races
at the Fair Grounds. The Kraazes were carrying a large amount of
money, allegedly intended for the purchase of race horses. As
described previously, two men gained access to their room with a
passkey supplied by the young desk clerk and fled with about $23,000.
The trial court held that the motel was liable for the full amount of
the cash stolen because of the gross negligence of its employee, the
desk clerk. This holding was based not on an interpretation of the
applicability of the $100 limitation in article 2971, but rather on the
trial court's conclusion that La Quinta had failed to comply adequately
with the notice requirements." The court of appeal affirmed on the
same grounds.45 The supreme court granted writs, stating that the
"primary issue" was "the delictual liability of an innkeeper for an
employee's negligence." 6 The court analyzed this "primary issue" in
two parts, addressing both the liability vel non of an innkeeper for
the fault of his employee
and the effect of article 2971 on the extent
47
of this liability.

42. Champion v. Panel Era Mfg. Co., 410 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Gray
& Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
43. La. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
44. 410 So. 2d at 1052.
45. Regarding the cash actually stolen from the room of the Kraazes, however,
this court would necessarily, due to our prior ruling in Zurich Insurance Co. v.
FairmontRoosevelt Hotel, Inc., have to declare that the defendant's liability was
limited to $100, if it had complied with the applicable codal articles in posting
a notice requesting the deposit of valuables. The trial judge, however, was not
convinced that such a notice had actually been posted in the room of the Kraazes,
and we do not find manifest error in that finding of fact ....
[W]e must hold
that since it was the court's finding the defendant did not comply with the [notice]
provisions ... , he is strictly liable to the plaintiffs ... for the loss of their stolen
money.
396 So. 2d 455, 459 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
46. 410 So. 2d at 1049.
47. According to the court, a "secondary issue [was] the quantum of damages
awarded plaintiffs." Id. Although by no means clear, it seems that the court apparently was referring to the large damage awards granted the plaintiffs for physical injury
and mental distress. The court, citing Louisiana Civil Code article 1934, held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in granting these awards. Id. at 1053
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The court first discussed the effect of article 2971 on the extent
of an innkeeper's delictual liability. Relying on its holding in Laubie
that "the limitation of liability in LSA-C.C. art. 2971 only applies to
the innkeeper's contractual liability as a depositary," the court concluded that the innkeeper was fully liable for "damages resulting from
fault on the part of him or his employees."4 Having reached this conclusion, the court further found that the desk clerk was at fault in
giving a passkey to armed robbers, that this fault was a direct cause
of the plaintiff's financial loss, and that, under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2320, the innkeeper was liable for the loss. 9 Thus, the Kraaz
court held both that an innkeeper is liable for the fault of his employee
and that the innkeeper's liability for such fault is not limited by article
2971 to $100.
Perhaps the Louisiana Supreme Court's treatment of article 2971
in Kraaz can be explained best as an effort to resolve the ambiguity
in that statute by forcing the legislature to provide a clear statement
of its intent. Prior to 1912, every statutory change had resulted in
the relaxation of the innkeeper's liability as a depositary. Thus, the
legislature conceivably may have meant for article 2971 to have a
similar effect. Although the words "by theft or otherwise" in the
article appear to be all-inclusive, one court has suggested that the
liability limitation is inapplicable where the innkeeper has "appropriated the articles or has enriched himself at the expense of the
guest."' ' Additionally, the innkeeper is unable to avail himself of the
freedom from liability provided by article 2969 if the loss is a result
of his fraud or negligence. These facts support the proposition that
the legislature intended that losses due to the innkeeper's negligence
be exempted from the $100 limitation in former article 2971. 1'
However, any ambiguity in article 2971 may be resolved by reading
it in pari materia with the other applicable articles.
Article 2971 appears in the Code immediately after six articles
which specify the instances in which the innkeeper is liable for losses
sustained by his guests.52 The article, before its recent amendment,

48. Id. at 1052.
49. Id. at 1053.
50. This suggestion was dictum in Pfennig v. Roosevelt Hotel, 31 So. 2d 31, 34
(La. App. Orl. 1947), but it seemingly is a logical exception to the broad "by theft
or otherwise" language in article 2971.
51. See Note, Innkeepers-Limitation of Liability for Loss of Guests' PropertyArticle 2971, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, 22 TUL. L. REV. 333, 335 (1947).
52. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2965-2970. The innkeeper is strictly liable under articles
2965 and 2966 for property delivered into his personal care or into the care of his
servant. Under article 2969, the. innkeeper who has complied with the provisions
requiring him to supply a safe and to post notices of its availability is liable to guest
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clearly provided that "no innkeeper shall be liable under the provisions of the foregoing six articles for losses in excess of $100. ' ' 1 3 This

$100 limitation clearly was intended to apply to article 2969, which
provides that the innkeeper is liable for a loss, due to its negligence
or fraud, of valuables not deposited with the innkeeper."4
In cases such as Kraaz, where considerable loss has occurred
because of patent negligence, the court's unwillingness to apply a
statute which limits liability to what seems to be (in comparison to
the actual loss) a paltry sum is understandable."5 As one judge has
stated, "[E]ven in the performance [of determining those policy-choices
and values reasonably intended by the legislation], it is a mistake to
conceive of the judge as an impersonal computer routinely clicking
out abstract answers uninfluenced by ideals of fairness for fellow
human beings."' In both Kraaz and DeBattista,the Louisiana Supreme
Court's "ideals of fairness" apparently led it to superimpose its conception of current societal needs upon two statutes which, when given
a fair interpretation, indicate a contrary legislative intent."
In a modern republic, the legislature -representative of and
responsive to the people-is considered to be better equipped than
the courts to determine societal needs and to have the flexibility
necessary to balance those needs against economic realities. Thus it
for the loss of valuables which are not delivered into his care only if the loss is a
result of the fraud or negligence of the innkeeper.
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2971 (as it appeared prior to its amendment by 1982 La.
Acts, No. 382, 5 1) (emphasis added).
54. Although Kraaz involved an article 2969 situation, the court held that article
2971 was not applicable to situations in which the innkeeper was at fault. Arguably,
valuables deposited with the innkeeper and lost because of his negligence also, under
this broad holding, would be excepted from the article 2971 limitation. Under the Kraaz
court's interpretation of the statutory scheme, the applicability of the limitation in
article 2971 is confined to the narrow instance in which property deposited with the
innkeeper is lost through no fault of the innkeeper. As evidenced by the recent amendment to article 2971, the legislature did not intend to grant such marginal relief.
55. Perhaps the increase of liability in article 2971, as amended, to $500 will make
the application of the article a less painful task. Prior to its amendment, article 2971
arguably was vulnerable to attack on the ground that it violated the due process clause
in that the amount of recovery ($100) was not rationally related to the potential losses.
While it is questionable whether $500 is sufficient compensation for an average traveler's
loss today, the amount is not so low as to appear obviously inadequate. Cf. Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (statute limiting liability
for a single nuclear accident to $560 million held not a violation of due process).
56. Tate, The Judge's Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpretation,7 So.
U.L. REV. 147, 171 (1981).
57. For a discussion of the rdasonable legislative intent behind Civil Code article
1764, see Note, DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co.: The Meaning of
"Unreasonable Danger" in Louisiana Products Liability, 42 LA. L. REV. 1453, 1459 n.26
(1982).
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is to be expected that "law" is more commonly "found" these days
in statutes than was previously the case in a traditional common-law
jurisdiction. There is, however, an interesting current theory whichadvocates making statutes subject to amendment by the courts after
a specified period of time." The proponents of this seemingly heretical
theory, however, do not assert that. the courts inherently have this
power." Absent a statute expressly granting the courts the power
to amend legislative acts, when the legislature has made an economic
policy decision and has expressed this decision in a clear and unambiguous statute, judges should not begin "casting around in the hope
of finding, like so many Houdinis, the way to escape from [a] statutory
box""0 in an effort to effectuate their sense of "fairness for fellow
human beings."'" In reversing the fourth circuit's decision in Bazley
v. Tortorich,6" the supreme court stated that in the area of workers'
compensation, it was not "empowered" to "second guess" the'
legislature. 3 This language illustrates the course which the courts
probably should follow in all areas where the legislature has expressly
limited liability.
In its effort to circumvent the article 2971 limitation, the court
in the instant case placed much emphasis on the legal theory under
which the plaintiffs were allowed recovery. The plaintiffs were allowed
full recovery because their action was in tort. The decision implies
that if Mr. and Mrs. Kraaz had brought their suit in contract, alleging
only a breach of the innkeeper's duty as depositary, they would have
been denied recovery in excess of the statutory limit. Because the
extent of recovery was so closely connected with one legal theory
(tort) as opposed to another (contract), the decision suggests a return
to theory-of-the-case pleading, which was abolished in Louisiana by
the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure articles 862 and 2164.6
58. See Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes
Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203 (1979). For another favorable view of judicial amendment of

obsolete statutes, see G. CALABRISI, A

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

(1982).

59. Although the scope of this note does not allow an in-depth analysis of this
theory, it is interesting to note that its proponent seeks to give the courts this power
to "modify and overrule" statutes through the enactment of a statute. Davies, supra
note 58, at 204 n.7. The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act would apply to statutes which
had "been in effect for more than 20 years prior to the event or transaction to which
[they were] being applied" and which imposed "rules of private, rather than public
law." Id.
60. Gilmore, Putting Senator Davies in Context, 4 VT. L. REV. 233, 239 (1979). This
article provides an historical context for the proposal set forth by Senator Davies,
supra note 58.
61. Tate, supra note 56 at 171.
62. 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981), rev'g 380 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
63. 397 So. 2d at 484-85.
64. See text at notes 23-30, supra.
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65 was merely
Perhaps the court, in both Kraaz and DeBattista,
finding the plaintiff an "out" from under a statutory limitation by
classifying the actions as delictual rather than contractual.6 Since,
under a fact pleading system, the plaintiff is entitled to relief under
any theory of law which may be justified by the facts, classification
of the cause of action by the court in order to enable the plaintiff to
recover is a proper method of analysis. However, theory-of-the-case
pleading is being employed to the litigant's detriment when recovery
is dependent upon the litigant's characterization of the case. In the
future, courts should be careful when recovery is linked to one theory,
as opposed to another, to avoid the implication that it is the litigant
who must "at his peril choose [the] particular weapon with which to
wage the imminent battle." 7

Sybil Hope Stephens

65. In DeBattista, recovery was allowed because the plaintiff based her action
on strict liability (tort) as well as on implied warranty of fitness (contract). For a clear
example of the court's tendency to revert to theory pleading, see Meador v. Toyota
of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
66. In Champion v. Panel Era Mfg. Co., 410 So. 2d 1230 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982)
and Gray & Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 292 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), the courts
of appeal "classified" the plaintiffs' actions in order to allow recovery. See text at
notes 40-43, supra.
67. Hubert, supra note 25, at 459.

